In this paper we incorporate integrity constraints in abstract argumentation frameworks. Two types of semantics are considered for these constrained frameworks: conflict-free and conflict-tolerant. The first one is a conservative extension of standard approaches for giving coherent-based semantics to argumentation frameworks, where in addition certain constraints must be satisfied. A primary consideration behind this approach is a dismissal of any contradiction between accepted arguments of the constrained frameworks. The second type of semantics preserves contradictions, which are regarded as meaningful and sometimes even critical for the conclusions. We show that this approach is particularly useful for assuring the existence of non-empty extensions and for handling contradictions among the constraints, in which cases conflict-free extensions are not available.
Introduction
Dung's argumentation framework [1] is a graph-style representation of what may be viewed as a dispute. It is instantiated by a set of abstract objects, called arguments, and a binary relation on this set that intuitively represents attacks between arguments. These structures have been found useful for modeling a range of formalisms for non-monotonic reasoning, including default logic [2] , logic programming under stable model semantics [3] , three-valued stable model semantics [4] and well-founded model semantics [5] , Nute's defeasible logic [6] , and so on.
Despite of their general nature, experience shows that in some cases argumentation frameworks lack sufficient expressivity for accurately capturing their domain, and some extra apparatus is needed to gain a more comprehensive representation of the relations among the arguments. This observation motivated several works, like those of Amgoud and Cayrol [7] , Bench-Capon [8] , and Modgil [9] , in which in addition to the argumentation framework itself, some additional meta-knowledge is provided, e.g. in terms of ranking values or preference relations on the arguments. This helps to refine and improve the process of selecting the arguments that can collectively be accepted according to the argumentation framework at hand.
In this paper we formalize the additional knowledge that is linked to argumentation frameworks in terms of integrity constraints, that is, conditions that every accepted set of arguments must satisfy. Let us demonstrate the advantages of using constraints by means of a few simple and (for the time being) informal examples.
Example 1.
Medical systems, as well as legal systems, are rule-based, and as such they are naturally representable by argumentation frameworks (see, e.g., [10] ). Yet, even in these systems not all the rules are of equal importance or relevance for specific cases. Thus, for instance, arguments referring to concrete results concerning medical tests of a particular patient are usually given precedence over, say, arguments referring to general symptoms of a disease. This may be expressed by constraints obliging the reasoner to take these test results into account when stating a diagnosis (i.e., include them in every accepted set of arguments obtained by the framework), or by extra rules that confront arguments that not necessarily attack one another. More generally, integrity constraints provide means of expressing relations among the arguments which are not representable by 'standard' attack relations.
Example 2.
The incorporation of constraints may be useful in handling scenarios where an argumentation framework is viewed as a dynamic process [11] . For instance, constraints may encode the expected outcome of an argumentation framework, or may help to evaluate the consequences of an argumentation framework in light of new arguments (see [12] ). Example 3. Constraints may also serve as a means for keeping the semantics of an argumentation framework coherent. To see this, consider the three arguments in the last example of [13] : "John will be on the tandem bicycle because he wants to", "Mary will be on the tandem bicycle because she wants to" and "Suzy will be on the tandem bicycle because she wants to". Here, integrity constraints may explicitly specify that these three arguments are in a collective conflict when the tandem has only two seats -a fact which is difficult to grasp only by standard semantical approaches to argumentation systems (see [13] ).
Example 4.
The use of meta-knowledge, e.g. in terms of integrity constraints, is a convenient way for accommodating conflicting arguments. Consider, for instance, an information system representing information about the theory of light. Here, the phenomena of interference on one hand and the photoelectric effect on the other hand may stand behind conflicting arguments about whether light is a particle or a wave. Any choice between such arguments would obviously be arbitrary, and the dismissal of one of them would unavoidably yield erroneous conclusions about the nature of light. The incorporation of suitable constraints, forcing the acceptance of both arguments, could be an effective way of keeping the underlying theory realistic and non-biased.
Interestingly, in the last two examples integrity constraints have opposite roles: in Example 3 (and often also in the context of Example 2) they serve as an additional mechanism that excludes conflicts among accepted arguments, while in Example 4 (and sometimes also in Example 1) they actually adapt for conflicts which are inherent to the state of affairs. Clearly, such opposing situations require two different treatments, and in this paper we refer to both of them, namely, we consider coherence-based (or conflict-free) constrained systems on one hand and paraconsistent (or conflict-tolerant) systems on the other hand. In both cases we show how argumentation frameworks and integrity constraints are incorporated, define appropriate semantics for maintaining conflicts, and describe corresponding methods of representing and computing their consequences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we review the basics behind Dung's abstract argumentation theory and recall the primary methods of giving it conflict-free and conflict-tolerant semantics. In Section 3 we consider constrained argumentation frameworks (CAFs). Again, we distinguish between cases in which conflicts should be dismissed and those in which conflicts may be accepted. In both cases we define appropriate semantics, compare them, are examine their basic properties. In Section 4 we consider some representation and computation aspects of reasoning with CAFs, and in Section 5 we conclude.
Preliminaries

Abstract Argumentation Frameworks and Their Semantics
Let us first recall the basics behind Dung's theory of abstract argumentation [1] .
Definition 5.
An argumentation framework is a pair AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩, where Args is a set (of arguments) and Attack is a relation on Args ×Args.
In what follows we shall assume that the argumentation frameworks are finite, that is, their sets of arguments are finite. When (A, B) ∈ Attack we say that A attacks B (or that B is attacked by A). The set of arguments that are attacked by A is denoted by A + and the set of arguments that attack A is denoted by A − . This may be extended to sets of arguments as follows:
+ is the set of arguments that are attacked by some argument in E and E − = ∪ A∈E A − is the set of arguments that attack some argument in E. We denote by Def(E) the set of arguments that are defended by E, in the sense that each attacker of an argument in this set is counter-attacked by (an argument in) E. Formally:
The primary principles for accepting arguments in Dung-style argumentation are the following: Definition 6. Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework and let E ⊆ Args be a set of arguments.
• E is conflict-free (with respect to AF) iff E ∩ E + = ∅.
• E is an admissible extension (of AF) iff it is conflict free and E ⊆ Def(E).
• E is a complete extension (of AF) iff it is conflict free and E = Def(E).
Thus, conflict-freeness assures that no argument in the set is attacked by another argument in the set. Admissibility guarantees, in addition, that the set is self-defendant, and complete sets are admissible ones that defend exactly themselves. These principles are a cornerstone of a variety of extension-based semantics for an argumentation framework AF, i.e., formalizations of sets of arguments that can collectively be accepted according to AF. Some of these semantics are listed next (see also [1, 13, 14] ).
Definition 7.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework and let E ⊆ Args. Below, the minimum and maximum are taken with respect to set inclusion.
• E is a grounded extension of AF iff it is a minimal complete extension of AF.
• E is a preferred extension of AF iff it is a maximal complete extension of AF.
• E is a stable extension of AF iff it is a complete extension of A and
• E is a semi-stable extension of AF iff it is a complete extension of AF where E ∪ E + is maximal among all the complete extensions of AF.
Argument acceptability may now be defined as follows: Skeptical and credulous acceptance may be defined also with respect to other types of extensions. We refer, e.g., to [13, 14] for further details.
An alternative way to describe argumentation semantics is based on the concept of an argument labeling, defined next (see [15, 16] ).
Definition 10.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework. An argument labeling is a complete function lab : Args → {in, out, undec}. We shall sometimes write In(lab) for {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = in}, Out(lab) for {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = out} and Undec(lab) for {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = undec}.
In essence, an argument labeling expresses a position on which arguments one accepts (labeled in), which arguments one rejects (labeled out), and which arguments one abstains from having an explicit opinion about (labeled undec). Since a labeling lab of AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ can be seen as a partition of Args, following [15] we shall sometimes write it as a triple ⟨In(lab), Out(lab), Undec(lab)⟩.
In a somewhat more logic-based fashion, labelings may be viewed as valuations. In what follows we denote by L Args a propositional language whose atomic formulas are associated with the arguments of an argumentation framework ⟨Args, Attack ⟩. A labeling in this context is then a truth-valued assignment for the atoms of L Args . We shall associate the label in with the truth value t that represents truth, the label out will be associated with the truth value f that represents falsity, and undec is associated with the middle (neutral) element ⊥. Given a labeling lab on {in, out, undec} we shall denote by LV(lab) the associated valuation on {t, f, ⊥} and conversely: for a valuation ν on {t, f, ⊥} we denote by VL(ν) the associated labeling on {in, out, undec}. The following postulates allow to associate labelings also with extensions. 1 The functions' names abbreviate their roles: LV stands for 'labelings to valuations' and VL stands for 'valuations to labelings'. We use similar notations for the other mappings defined in the sequel (see, e.g, Proposition 13 and Definition 19 below).
Definition 11.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework, lab an argument labeling for Args, and A ∈ Args. We consider the following conditions on lab:
Pos1
If lab(A) = in then there is no B ∈ A − such that lab(B) = in.
Pos2
If lab(A) = in then for every B ∈ A − it holds that lab(B) = out. Based on the concepts of conflict-free labelings and complete labelings, one may define labelings that correspond to the extensions considered in Definition 7.
Neg
Definition 12.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework and let lab be a complete labeling of AF. Below, the minimum and the maximum are taken with respect to set inclusion.
• lab is a grounded labeling of AF iff In(lab) is minimal in {In(l) | l is a complete labeling of AF}.
• lab is a preferred labeling of AF iff In(lab) is maximal in {In(l) | l is a complete labeling of AF}.
• lab is a stable labeling of AF iff Undec(lab) = ∅.
• lab is a semi-stable labeling of AF iff Undec(lab) is minimal in {Undec(l) | l is a complete labeling of AF}.
The following correspondence between extensions and labelings is shown in [16] Similar correspondence hold between the extensions in Definition 7 and the corresponding labelings in Definition 12 (see [16] ).
Conflict-Tolerant Semantics
As we noted in the introduction, for properly reflecting real-life situations it is occasionally required to abandon the conflict-freeness assumption behind standard argumentation semantics, so it might happen that accepted arguments attack each other. When constraints are incorporated, conflict tolerance is sometimes essential, since -as we shall see shortly -even constraints of a very simple form may imply mutual attacks among accepted arguments. To handle this we incorporate the conflicting-tolerant semantics for argumentation frameworks introduced in [17, 18] . In this section we briefly recall this semantics.
2
The most straightforward way of maintaining conflicts while still being as faithful as possible to the conflict-free semantics considered previously is by lifting the conflict-freeness requirement in Definition 6, while keeping the other properties in the same definition. Thus, any argument in an extension must still be defended (to avoid arbitrary acceptance of arguments).
Definition 14.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework and let E ⊆ Args.
• E is a paraconsistently admissible (or: p-admissible) extension for AF, if E ⊆ Def(E).
• E is a paraconsistently complete (or: p-complete) extension for AF, if E = Def(E).
Thus, every admissible (respectively, complete) extension for AF is also padmissible (respectively, p-complete) extension for AF, but not the other way around. Note that, as in the case of conflict-free semantics, p-grounded and ppreferred extensions may be defined by taking, respectively, the subset-minimal and the subset-maximal p-complete extensions. Figure 2 has two p-complete extensions: ∅ (which is also the only complete extension in this case), and {A, B, C}. As in the case of conflict-free semantics, there is a dual way of representing p-admissible and p-complete extensions, which is based on labeling functions. This time, however, four labels are necessary for depicting the possible states of an argument.
Definition 18.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework. A four-states labeling for AF is a complete function lab : Args → {in, out, none, both}. Again, we shall write In(lab) for {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = in} and Out(lab) for {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = out}. Also, None(lab) is the set {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = none} and Both(lab) is the set {A ∈ Args | lab(A) = both}.
As before, a labeling function reflects the state of mind of the reasoner regarding each argument in AF: In(lab) is the set of arguments that one accepts, Out(lab) is the set of arguments that one rejects, None(lab) is the set of arguments that may neither be accepted nor rejected, and Both(lab) is the set of arguments that have both supportive and rejective evidences. In the sequel we shall sometimes represent a 4-states labeling lab by the quadruple ⟨In(lab), Out(lab), None(lab), Both(lab)⟩.
Given a labeling lab on {in, out, both, none} we shall denote by pLV(lab) the associated valuation on {t, f, ⊤, ⊥} and conversely: for a valuation ν on {t, f, ⊤, ⊥} we denote by pVL(ν) the associated labeling on {in, out, both, none}. Here, ⊤ is the truth value that intuitively represents contradictory information and ⊥ is the truth value that intuitively represents lack of information (see Section 3.2).
Again, one may switch between extensions and labelings using appropriate mapping functions: Definition 19. Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework.
• Given a set E ⊆ Args of arguments, the function that is induced by (or, is associated with) E is the four-valued labeling pEL AF (E) of AF, defined for every A ∈ Args as follows:
A four-valued labeling that is induced by some subset of Args is called a paraconsistent labeling (or a p-labeling) of AF.
• Given a four-valued labeling lab of AF, the set of arguments that is induced by (or, is associated with) lab is defined by
As in the conflict-free case, special labeling postulates are defined for guaranteeing a one-to-one correspondence between extension-based and labeling-based conflict-tolerant semantics.
Definition 20.
Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework.
• A p-labeling lab for AF is p-admissible if it satisfies the following rules:
• A p-labeling lab for AF is p-complete if it satisfies the following rules:
Proposition 21. Let AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ be an argumentation framework.
• 
Constrained Argumentation Frameworks
We now consider constrained argumentation frameworks. These are argumentation frameworks augmented with set of formulas (the 'constraints') that should be satisfied by any extension or labeling of the framework. As indicated in the introduction, such formulas are useful for introducing additional knowledge that cannot be extracted from the framework itself, such as arguments dependencies, relations among arguments that are not depicted by the attack relation, preferences among arguments, and so forth. Below, we distinguish between two cases: the first one, considered in Section 3.1, is based on 3-valued, conflict-free semantics. The other case, considered in Section 3.2, relies on 4-valued, conflict-tolerant semantics. The choice which approach to use depends, of-course, on the situation at hand and on the plausibility of accommodating contradictory data and conflicting arguments.
Three-Valued Conflict-Free Semantics
First, we consider constrained argumentation frameworks whose semantics is conflict-free. The constraints in such frameworks are expressed by formulas in the language L Args , whose atomic formulas are associated with the arguments Args of the framework. In addition, L Args contains the connectives ∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬, and the propositional constants t, f, and u that intuitively correspond to the three states in, out, undec, of conflict-free labeling functions. As noted in Section 2.1, a conflict-free labeling lab for an argumentation framework AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ corresponds to a truth assignment (valuation) LV(lab) of values from the atoms of L Args to {t, f, ⊥}.
3 These valuations may be extended to complex formulas in {∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬} by Kleene's three-valued interpretations for the disjunction ∨, conjunction ∧ and negation ¬ (see [19] ), and by S lupecki's interpretation for the implication ⊃ (see [20, 21] ), 4 as follows:
As usual in this context, we say that a 3-valued valuation ν satisfies (or, is a 3-valued model of) a set of formulas S, if ν(ψ) = t for every ψ ∈ S. We denote the set of the 3-valued models of S by mod 3 (S).
Example 23. Consider again Example 3, and denote by A 1 , A 2 and A 3 the three arguments mentioned there. The restriction that these arguments cannot be accepted together may be enforced by adding, e.g., the integrity constraint
arguments, and so they obviously apply to those that must be accepted Note 29. The constrained argumentation frameworks considered in [18] and in [23] are a particular case of those in Definition 25, where Const is restricted to atomic formulas only.
Constrained argumentation frameworks are also considered by Coste-Marquis, Devred and Marquis in [24] . The main difference is that in [24] the interpretations are determined by completeness semantics: a subset E ⊆ Args is associated with a two-valued valuation that is induced by its completionÊ = {A | A ∈ E} ∪ {¬A | A ̸ ∈ E}, and satisfiability of constraints is with respect to two-valued semantics. It follows, e.g., that a constraint of the form A ∨ ¬A is useless according to [24] (since it is always satisfied), while in our 3-valued semantics this constraint indicates that the argument A cannot have a neutral status. What is more, the use of 3-valued semantics allows us to distinguish between different restrictions on arguments: the constraint ¬A means that A should be rejected, while the constraint A ⊃ f is a somewhat weaker demand, that A should not be accepted, and so its status may be undecided. 6 We thus believe that a 3-valued semantics for the constraints is more in line with standard 3-state semantics of argumentation frameworks.
Another difference between the approaches is that in our case the integrity constraints are admissible. This assures Propositions 33 and 37 below, which do not hold in the case of [24] , where non-empty extensions for CAFs may not exist. Recently, Booth et al. [11] provided a method for generating non-empty conflictfree extensions for constrained argumentation frameworks, but the price for that is a waiving of the principle of admissibility, so in their formalism not only the integrity constraints, but also the extensions themselves may not be admissible. Thus, for instance, the addition of the (non-admissible) constraint A ∨ B ∨ C to the argumentation framework AF 2 of Figure 2 would yield, according to [11] , three extensions {A}, {B}, {C}, each one is conflict-free, but neither of them is admissible.
Obviously, when the constraints are weakened (respectively, strengthened), the set of extensions may be expanded (respectively, reduced): We now turn to the issue of the existence of extensions for CAFs.
Proposition 33. Every CAF has an admissible extension/labeling.
Proof. Immediate from the fact that Const is admissible.
Next, we show that complete extensions and labelings are guaranteed for CAFs whose constraints are in the language of {∨, ∧, ¬} (see Proposition 37). For this, we first need a definition and a lemma. Proof. Let CAF = ⟨Args, Attack , Const⟩ be a constrained argumentation framework. By Proposition 33 there is an admissible labeling lab for CAF. In particular, lab is an admissible labeling of AF = ⟨Attack , Const⟩ and LV(lab) is a 3-valued model of Const. If lab is also a complete labeling of AF, it is a complete labeling of CAF and so we are done. Otherwise, it is well-known that lab can be 'completed', that is, turned into a complete labeling lab c of AF, by changing some of its undec-assignments to in or out-assignments (so that the rule Neither in Definition 11 will be satisfied without violating the rules Pos2 and Neg in the same definition). The next example shows that the condition in Proposition 37 is indeed necessary.
Example 38. Consider the constrained argumentation framework that consists of the argumentation framework in Figure 3 and the constraint A ∧ (C ⊃ f). We have that ⟨{A}, {B}, {C}⟩ is an admissible labeling for this constrained framework (since the valuation ν that is associated with this labeling, in which ν(A) = t, ν(B) = f and ν(C) = ⊥, satisfies the constraint), however, there is no complete labeling of this framework for which the constraint holds.
Note 39. Let |= 3 be the standard 3-valued satisfiability entailment, defined by Γ |= 3 ∆ if mod 3 (Γ) ⊆ mod 3 (∆). Then, in fact, Proposition 37 is no longer true not only for ⊃ (as Example 38 shows), but also for every 3-valued implication → which is |= 3 -deductive and is a conservative extension to the 3-valued case of the material implication. Indeed, since → is |= 3 -deductive, ⊥ → f = t (Otherwise ⊥ → f ̸ = t, and so, while A ∧ ¬A |= 3 f, we have that ̸ |= 3 (A ∧ ¬A) → f because ν(A) = ⊥ is a counter-model). But if ⊥ → f = t then again the last example shows that Proposition 37 fails for languages with →. Indeed, ν(A) = t, ν(B) = f and ν(C) = ⊥ would still satisfy the constraint in that example, but for no complete extension of the argumentation framework of Figure 3 the constraint holds, otherwise both A and C would have been labeled in, so the associated valuation would assign t to both of them, and to satisfy C → f we would need to have t → f = t (which is impossible for any conservative extension of the material implication).
We turn now to grounded extensions. This time, as the next example shows, their existence is not guaranteed even for CAFs whose constraints are in the language without ⊃. The example also shows that (in contrast to standard argumentation frameworks) a subset-minimal complete extension of a CAF need not be its grounded extension. of Example 28 does not have a grounded extension since the grounded extension of AF 1 is the emptyset, but the associated 3-valued valuation, which is the uniform ⊥-assignment, does not satisfy the constraint A∨B. This is also the reason that the argumentation framework CAF A∨B 4 , consisting of the argumentation framework AF 4 in Figure 4 and the same integrity constraint, does not have a grounded extension. We note that both of ⟨{A, C}, {B, D}, {}⟩ and ⟨{B, D}, {A, C}, {}⟩ are complete extensions of AF 4 , and the 3-valued valuations that are associated with them satisfy A∨B. Therefore, CAF A∨B 4 has two complete extensions, both of which are minimal (with respect to the subset relation) among the complete extensions of AF 4 that satisfy the constraint, but neither of them is a grounded extension of AF 4 . Clearly, when a grounded extension of a CAF does exist, it is the unique subset-minimal complete extension of that CAF.
Four-Valued Conflict-Tolerant Semantics
We now turn to constrained argumentation frameworks whose semantics is conflict-tolerant. Again, the constraints are expressed by a language whose atomic formulas are associated with the arguments Args of the framework and whose connectives are in ∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬. In addition, the language contains the propositional constants t, f, n, and b that intuitively correspond to the four states {in, out, none, both} of conflict-tolerant labeling functions. In what follows we shall continue to denote such languages by L Args . Again, as noted in Section 2.1, a conflict-tolerant labeling lab for an argumentation framework AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ corresponds to a truth assignment (valuation) pLV(lab) of values in {t, f, ⊥, ⊤} to the atoms of L Args . These valuations are extended to complex formulas with connectives in {∨, ∧, ⊃, ¬} by the following Belnap's four-valued interpretations for the disjunction ∨, conjunction ∧ and negation ¬ (see [25] ), and by D'Ottaviano and da-Costa's interpretation for the implication ⊃ (see [20, 26, 27] ).
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Following [22, 25] , we say that a valuation ν satisfies (or, is a 4-valued model of) a set of formulas S if ν(ψ) ∈ {t, ⊤} for every ψ ∈ S. We denote the set of the 4-valued models of S by mod 4 (S).
Since conflict-tolerant semantics permits mutual attacks among accepted arguments, the integrity constraints in such cases may be contradictory. Accordingly, we relax the assumptions on plausible integrity constraints compared to those taken in the previous section, and now only require that they would have p-admissible interpretations (so their accepted arguments shouldn't be exposed to undefended attacks). Example 42. The formula Ψ 1 = A ∧ ¬C ∧ (C ⊃ f) is not p-admissible (and so it is not admissible) for the argumentation framework in Figure 3 , because it requires that A will be accepted and C will be rejected at the same time. Indeed, any 4-valued model of this formula must assign f to C, thus the associated labeling assigns out to C. If this labeling were p-admissible, then by pOut B would have been assigned either in or both. In turn, this means that A should have been assigned either out or both, and so either pOut or pBoth were violated (respectively) when applied to A (since A does not have any attacker).
In contrast, the formula Ψ 2 = A ∧ (C ⊃ f) is p-admissible for the argumentation framework in Figure 3 , since it is already admissible for this framework (see Example 38). Intuitively, the difference between the two constraints is that unlike Ψ 1 , which requires the rejection of C, Ψ 2 poses a weaker constraint on C, according to which C may as well be undecided.
Definition 43.
A paraconsistent constrained argumentation framework (pCAF, for short) is a triple pCAF = ⟨Args, Attack , Const⟩, where AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ is an argumentation framework and Const (the constraints) is a set of formulas in L Args that is p-admissible for AF.
Note 44. Since every admissible set for AF is also a p-admissible for AF, we have that every CAF is also a pCAF (but not the other way around).
Definition 45. Let p CAF = ⟨Args, Attack , Const⟩ be a p-constrained argumentation framework and let Sem be a conflict-tolerant semantics for AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩. Example 47. Consider again the argumentation framework AF 1 of Figure 1 and the constraint A ∧ B. Since this constraint is not conflict-free for AF 1 (i.e., no 3-valued valuation that satisfies it is associated with a conflict-free labeling of AF 1 ), it is not admissible for AF 1 . However, this constraint is p-admissible for AF 1 (since, e.g., the four-states labeling lab that assigns both to A and to B and out to C and to D is a p-admissible labeling of AF 1 , and pLV(lab) is a 4-valued model of A ∧ B). Therefore, CAF A "The bacteria in the blood is of type X and so a bacteria is present, but it cannot be of type Y " B "The bacteria in the blood is of type Y and so a bacteria is present, but it cannot be of type X" C "There is no bacterial infection thus no further medical examinations are required"
D "Further medical examinations are required and so another visit to the clinic should be scheduled" Figure 5 shows an argumentation framework that depicts the interactions among these rules. Here, an argument attacks another if the consequence of the former contradicts an assumption of the latter. Now, suppose that two blood tests of a patient indicate that a bacteria of a certain type is present, but each one indicates that the bacteria is of a different type: one indicates that it is of type X and the other one indicates that it is of type Y . Obviously, at least one of the tests is erroneous. Assuming that other blood tests are not available and that further tests cannot be taken, what can still be inferred in this case? One way of verifying this is to consider the pCAF that is obtained by the framework of Figure 5 and the constraint A ∧ B.
9 This pCAF has three p-admissible labelings, all of them assign the label both to A and to B (since both of these arguments should be accepted although they attack each other), but they differ regarding the statuses of the other arguments: one indicates that both C and D are contradictory, another one rejects C and accepts D, and the third one rejects C and labels D as undecided. Despite the inconsistency, then, the negation of argument C holds in all of the labelings, while neither D nor its negation are acceptable. This may be intuitively explained by the facts that a bacterial infection was detected (and so argument C is not relevant and should not be accepted), but according to the available information this does not necessarily mean that further medical examinations are required (thus D does not necessarily hold).
The next proposition is the dual, for conflict-tolerant semantics, of Proposition 30. 
Proof. Similar to that of Proposition 30.
We now turn to the issue of the existence of acceptable sets of arguments for pCAFs. It turns out that the situation is quite similar to that of CAFs (cf. Propositions 33 and 37).
Proposition 50. Every pCAF has a p-admissible extension/labeling.
Proof. Immediate from the fact that Const is p-admissible.
We now show that, like the 3-valued case, p-complete extensions and labelings are guaranteed for pCAFs whose constraints are in the language of {∨, ∧, ¬} (Proposition 56). For this, we first need a definition and two lemmas.
Definition 51. We define partial orders on 4-valued valuations and 4-states labelings as follows:
• We denote by ≤ k the partial order on {t, f, ⊤, ⊥} in which ⊥ is the ≤ kminimal element, ⊤ is the ≤ k -maximal element, and t and f are (incomparable) intermediate elements. Accordingly, we define a partial order on 4-valued valuations by pointwise comparisons of their atomic assignments: given 4-valued valuations ν and µ on Args, we denote by
• A similar partial order is defined on 4-states labelings: we denote by ≤ k the partial order on {in, out, none, both} in which none is the ≤ k -minimal element, both is the ≤ k -maximal element, and in and out are (incomparable) intermediate elements. Accordingly, a partial order ≤ k is defined on 4-states labeling by pointwise comparisons on the labels that they attach to the arguments:
Note 52. Clearly, it holds that
The partial orders ≤ k defined above are known as the Belnap's knowledge orders on his 4-valued bilattice [25] . Intuitively, they reflect differences in the amount of information exhibited by the compared elements (see also [22] ).
Lemma 53. For every p-admissible labeling lab a of an argumentation framework AF there is a p-complete labeling lab
Proof. Let lab a be a p-admissible labeling of AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩. If it is also p-complete, we are done. Otherwise, lab a violates one or more postulates among pIn + , pOut + , pBoth + , pNone + for one or more arguments in Args (see Definition 20) . On the other hand, lab a is p-admissible, thus it satisfies postulates pIn, pOut, pBoth and pNone. Since the postulates regarding in-assignments and both-assignments of p-admissible and p-complete labelings coincide, the only postulates that may be violated are pOut + or pNone + .
• Suppose first that lab a violates pNone + for some argument A. In this case lab a (A) = none and pNone is satisfied with respect to A. This may only happen if for every B ∈ A − it holds that lab a (B) = out. We therefore apply the following correction rule:
[none in]: if lab(A) = none and ∀B ∈ A − it holds that lab(B) = out, then let lab(A) = in.
The last rule fixes the problem regarding A (which now satisfies pIn + ), but it may cause a violation of pNone + regarding another argument: a nonelabeled argument that was attacked by another none-labeled argument may now be attacked by an in-labeled argument. To fix this we need another rule:
It is easy to verify that this additional rule indeed fixes the postulate violation and does not cause additional violations of the postulates for p-complete labelings.
• Suppose now that lab a violates pOut + for some argument A. In this case lab a (A) = out and pOut is satisfied with respect to A. This may only happen if for every B ∈ A − it holds that lab a (B) ∈ {both, out} (and at least one of them is assigned both). We therefore apply the following correction rule:
[out both]: if lab(A) = out and ∀B ∈ A − it holds that lab(B) ∈ {both, out}, then let lab(A) = both.
Again, the last rule fixes the problem regarding A (which now satisfies pBoth + ), but it may cause a violation of pIn + regarding another argument: an in-labeled argument that was attacked only by out-labeled arguments may now be attacked by a both-labeled argument (and so pIn + is violated). To fix this we again need an additional rule:
[in both]: if lab(A) = in and ∃B ∈ A − such that lab(B) = both, then let lab(A) = both.
As in the previous case, it is easy to verify that this additional rule fixes the postulate violation and does not cause further violations of the postulates for p-complete labelings.
Let now lab c be the labeling lab a modified according to the above four correction rules. Then lab c is a p-complete labeling of AF, and since each rule increases the assignments with respect to the ≤ k -order (Definition 51), we have that
Example 54. Consider again the p-admissible labelings of AF 1 (Figure 1) , listed in the Proof. The above lemma resembles Lemma 35 in the 3-valued case. Again, its validity follows from the fact that the ≤ k relation is extendable to complex formulas: if µ(A) ≥ k ν(A) for every A ∈ Args then µ(ψ) ≥ k ν(ψ) for every formula ψ in the language of {∨, ∧, ¬}. (The proof here is, again, by induction on the structure of ψ). This is true, in particular, for every constraint ψ. Thus, if ν(ψ) ∈ {t, ⊤} for ψ ∈ Const, also µ(ψ) ∈ {t, ⊤}, and so µ is a model of Const. Note 57. Examples 38 and 40 may be used for showing that also in the case of conflict-tolerant semantics when the implication ⊃ appears in the constraints, the underlying pCAF may not have any p-complete extensions/labelings and that there may be several minimal p-complete extensions (with respect to the subset relation) for the same pCAF.
Conflict Minimization
Generally, although conflicts in pCAFs are sometimes unavoidable (e.g., when the set of constraints is not conflict-free, see Item (b) of Proposition 61 below), they obviously should be minimized as much as possible. In Example 48, for instance, the pCAF that consists of the argumentation framework of Figure 5 and the constraint A ∧ B has three p-complete labelings. However, just two of these labelings are really informative, and the third one, assigning both to all the arguments, is somewhat anomalous. This motivates the next definition.
Definition 58.
• A p-admissible (respectively, p-complete) labeling lab of an argumentation framework AF is minimally conflicting, if there is no p-admissible (respectively, p-complete) labeling lab ′ of AF, such that Both(lab ′ ) Both(lab).
• We say that a p-admissible (respectively, p-complete) labeling lab of a pCAF ⟨Args, Attack , Const⟩ is minimally conflicting, if it is a minimally conflicting p-admissible (respectively, minimally conflicting p-complete) labeling of ⟨Args, Attack ⟩.
Proposition 59. The following two conditions are equivalent and define a minimally conflicting p-admissible (respectively, minimally conflicting p-complete) extension E of AF:
EL AF (E) is a minimally conflicting p-admissible (respectively, minimally conflicting p-complete) labeling of AF.
A similar equivalence holds for minimally conflicting p-extensions of a pCAF.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 21 and Definition 58.
Example 60. Let us consider again the p-constrained argumentation framework CAF A∧B 1 of Example 47.
• Among the four p-admissible extensions of CAF Proof. The first part follows from the fact that every argumentation framework has a complete (and so admissible) extension, thus it has a conflict-free pcomplete (and p-admissible) extension. This implies that all of its minimally conflicting p-complete (and p-admissible) extensions must be conflict-free. For the proof of the second part, note that if a minimally conflicting pcomplete extension E of p CAF is conflict-free, then pEL AF (E) is a conflict-free labeling of Const and pLV(pEL AF (E)) is a 3-valued model of Const, thus Const is conflict-free. Conversely, if Const is conflict-free, then since it is also padmissible, it is in particular admissible, and so it has a model ν such that pVL(ν) is an admissible labeling of AF and pLE(pVL(ν)) is an admissible extension of AF. The latter is extendable to a complete extension E of AF. Now, E is a conflict-free p-complete (p-admissible) extension of p CAF , and so, as in the proof of the first part, this implies that every minimally conflicting p-complete (p-admissible) extension of p CAF is conflict-free.
Reasoning with CAFs and pCAFs
In this section we show how the variety of semantics for CAFs and pCAFs considered previously in this paper can be represented (and computed) by propositional theories. In what follows we demonstrate this on pCAFs and 4-valued semantics. The case of CAFs and 3-valued semantics is obtained by some straightforward adjustments (which are often simplified representations). 
Using the above notations, the postulates in Definition 20 for the p-admissible labelings of AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩ may be represented as follows:
Similarly, the p-complete labelings of AF may be represented as follows (Below, we abbreviate by ψ ↔ ϕ the formula (ψ ⊃ ϕ) ∧ (ϕ ⊃ ψ)):
Clearly, an expression Φ(x) of those described above becomes a meaningful formula (in L Args ) only when, given an argumentation framework AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩, its variable x is substituted by an atom A that is associated with an argument A ∈ Args and the elements in A − are determined by Attack . In what follows we denote by Ψ(A, AF) the formula that is obtained from Φ(x) in this way.
Example 63. Consider the argumentation framework AF in Figure 5 (Example 48). When x = C we have that x − = {A, B}, and so:
A 4-valued model of pIn(C, AF) that assigns t to C must assign f to both of A and B. Thus, intuitively, this formula requires that every p-admissible labeling of AF that (strongly) accepts C must (strongly) reject both of A and B (see also Proposition 64 below).
For representing the p-labelings for AF we use the following theories:
The theories that represent p-labelings of pCAFs are obtained by adding the set of constraints to the above theories. For p CAF = ⟨Args, Attack , Const⟩ with AF = ⟨Args, Attack ⟩, we define: Proof. We show the first item; the proof of the second item is similar. The one-to-one correspondence between the p-admissible extensions and the p-admissible labelings of AF is shown in the first item of Proposition 21. It therefore remains to show the correspondence between 4-valued models of pADM(AF) and the 4-states p-admissible labelings of AF. Indeed,
• Let ν be a model of pADM(AF) and suppose that ν(A) = t. Then ν(strong-accept(A)) = t and since ν satisfies pIn(A, AF), it holds that for every B ∈ A − , ν(strong-reject(B)) ∈ {t, ⊤}, Thus, for every B ∈ A − , ν(B) = f . It follows that for every argument A such that pVL(ν)(A) = in, it holds that pVL(ν)(B) = out whenever B ∈ A − . Hence pVL(ν) satisfies the postulate pIn. Similar considerations show that the fact that ν satisfies the formulas pOut(x, AF), pBoth(x, AF), and pNone(x, AF) for every x ∈ Args guarantees, respectively, that pVL(ν) satisfies the postulates pOut, pBoth and pNone. Thus pVL(ν) is a p-admissible labeling of AF.
• Let lab be a p-admissible labeling of AF such that lab(A) = in. Then pLV(lab)(A) = t, and so we have that pLV(lab)(strong-reject(A)) = f , pLV(lab)(contradictory(A)) = f , and pLV(lab)(undecided(A)) = f . This implies, respectively, that pLV(lab) satisfies pOut(A, AF), pBoth(A, AF), and pNone(A, AF). The fact that pLV(lab) satisfies also pIn(A, AF) follows from the fact that lab satisfies the postulate pIn and so lab(B) = out for every B ∈ A − . This implies that pLV(lab)(B) = f for every B ∈ A − , and so pLV(lab)(strong-reject(B)) = t for every such B. The cases in which lab(A) ∈ {out, both, none} are similar, and so pLV(lab) is indeed a model of pADM(AF).
A similar proposition holds also for pCAFs: Proof. Similar to that of Proposition 64.
Example 66. Let p CAF be the p-constrained argumentation framework considered in Example 48: the argumentation framework is shown in Figure 5 and the constraint is accept(A) ∧ accept(B). The theory pADM(p CAF), simplified by some standard rewriting rules, is shown in Figure 6 . The three models of pADM(p CAF ) are listed in the table below.
As guaranteed by Proposition 65, these models correspond to the three padmissible lablings of p CAF (see Example 48).
Note 67. Propositional theories for reasoning with p-labeling and p-extensions of (p-constrained) argumentation frameworks are given also in [17] and [18] . Similar theories for reasoning with conflict-free semantics are described in [29] . The main difference is that in these papers the underlying semantics is twovalued and the shift back and forth from and to four-valued semantics is done through syntactical mappings using signed formulas (see also [30] ). In our case everything remains within the four-valued context.
Conclusion
The incorporation of integrity constraints in argumentation frameworks is a useful way of providing information about arguments. Such information may involve, for instance, meta-data in the form of preferences among arguments, external knowledge about the domain of discourse, or some instructive information that simplifies and clarifies the intended semantics at hand.
In this paper we extended and improved several previous works on constraining argumentation frameworks: the conflict-free semantics for CAFs considered in [24] are extended to conflict-tolerant ones, allowing to handle situations which are implicitly inconsistent or cases where the constraints themselves are contradictory. Another difference from the treatment in [24] is that here the constraints are evaluated with respect to the same semantics as that of the arguments: three-valued semantics for conflict-free systems and four-valued semantics for conflict-tolerant systems. In addition, the discussion on constrained argumentation frameworks in [18] , aimed at demonstrating the usefulness of conflict-tolerant semantics for argumentation frameworks, is largely extended in our case. In particular, the restriction of using only atomic constraints is lifted, and more general results on the existence of complete extensions for different forms of constraints are provided.
We note, finally, that evaluating the usefulness of constrained argumentation frameworks and assessing the plausibility of their semantics in realistic situations require a substantial experimental study. This remains a subject for future work.
